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      PRECEDENTIAL  
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                     ____________  
  
No. 19-1067 
____________  
  
CAROL LEE WALKER, 
                             Appellant  
 
v. 
 
SENIOR DEPUTY BRIAN T. COFFEY, In His Individual 
Capacity; 
SPECIAL AGENT PAUL ZIMMERER, In His Individual 
Capacity 
____________  
  
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
 
(D.C. No. 2-17-cv-00040)  
 
District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney  
____________  
  
Argued September 12, 2019  
  
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN and RESTREPO,  
Circuit  Judges  
    
(Opinion Filed: April 16, 2020)  
  
Geoffrey Richard Johnson [ARGUED] 
Stevens & Lee 
1818 Market Street 
29th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19103     
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  Counsel for Appellant  
  
Claudia M. Tesoro [ARGUED] 
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
1600 Arch Street 
Suite 300 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
    Counsel for Appellees  
___________  
  
OPINION OF THE COURT  
____________   
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Appellant Carol Lee Walker brought suit against a 
prosecutor and special agent from the Pennsylvania Office of 
the Attorney General (OAG) alleging they violated provisions 
of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. 
(SCA), by inducing her employer, Pennsylvania State 
University (Penn State or University), to disclose her work 
emails with a facially invalid subpoena.  Because the 
Appellees’ actions, although improper, did not violate the 
SCA, we will affirm the dismissal of Walker’s claims.   
I. 
 In July 2015, the OAG brought charges of forgery and 
computer crimes against Walker in Pennsylvania state court.  
The charges arose from a criminal investigation involving 
Walker’s husband and his trucking company.  The OAG 
assigned Senior Deputy Attorney General Brian Coffey as the 
prosecutor and Special Agent Paul Zimmerer as the lead 
investigator to her case.  Some charges against Walker were 
dropped after an August 2015 preliminary hearing, but four 
counts of conspiracy to commit forgery remained pending trial. 
 
 In October 2015, Coffey and Zimmerer requested that 
Penn State aid their investigation by producing Walker’s 
emails from her employee account.  Rather than disclose 
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Walker’s emails, however, Penn State officials requested the 
government agents produce a subpoena.  Coffey and Zimmerer 
obtained a subpoena form from the Centre County Court of 
Common Pleas but only partially completed the required fields.  
The subpoena listed the case caption, the intended recipient, 
and the request for “any & all emails/computer 
files/documents/attachments to or from Carol Lee Walker” at 
her Penn State email address.  Missing from the subpoena was 
information regarding the date, time or place where the 
testimony or evidence would be produced, or which party was 
requesting the evidence.  The OAG concedes that the subpoena 
was incomplete and therefore unenforceable.   
 
 On October 21, 2015, Zimmerer offered the facially 
invalid subpoena to Katherine Allen, Assistant General 
Counsel for Penn State.  Allen thereafter instructed a Penn 
State employee to assist Zimmerer with the production of the 
requested emails.  Sometime after the OAG obtained Walker’s 
emails, the pending criminal charges against her were 
dismissed with prejudice.  
 
 Walker filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
that Coffey and Zimmerer conducted an unreasonable search 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment by inducing Penn State 
to produce the emails with an invalid subpoena.  The District 
Court granted the Appellees’ motion to dismiss after 
concluding Coffey and Zimmerer were entitled to qualified 
immunity because Walker did not have a clearly established 
right to privacy in her work emails.  
 
 On appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed the District 
Court’s dismissal on qualified immunity grounds.  The panel 
held there was “no dispute” that the confiscated emails were 
sent or received by Walker’s work e-mail address, and the 
emails themselves were a “part of an email system controlled 
and operated by Penn State.” Walker v. Coffey, 905 F.3d 138, 
149 (3d Cir. 2018).  Because the “emails were subject to the 
common authority of [her] employer,” Walker “did not enjoy 
any reasonable expectation of privacy vis-à-vis Penn State.” Id.  
Thus, Fourth Amendment protection did not attach.   
 Given that Penn State exercised this dominion over its 
employees’ electronic communications, the panel held that the 
University had the authority to produce Walker’s work emails.  
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Significantly, the panel also concluded that Penn State acted 
through its attorney and produced the emails voluntarily, rather 
than under coercion resulting from the invalid subpoena.  
Rather than finding Coffey and Zimmerer “evade[d] the 
limitations of the Fourth Amendment by inducing [Penn State] 
to do what [it] cannot,” the panel held that Penn State was a 
private party that exercised its “independent ability to consent 
to a search.” Id.  In reaching this conclusion, the panel 
emphasized that it did not condone Coffey and Zimmerer’s 
improper use of an invalid subpoena.  While noting the 
impropriety of the OAG’s actions, it determined that under the 
circumstances—Penn State acting within its legal authority and 
through its own counsel—the University’s compliance with the 
government’s request for the emails was voluntary “despite the 
facial invalidity of the subpoena.”  Id. at 150. 
 
 Because Coffey and Zimmerer did not violate Walker’s 
right to privacy, the panel agreed with the District Court that 
they were entitled to qualified immunity and affirmed the 
dismissal of her § 1983 claim.  However, it vacated the District 
Court’s order denying Walker leave to file a second amended 
complaint to address a new claim under the SCA.  Id. at 150-
51. 
 
 Walker filed an amended complaint alleging that Coffey 
and Zimmerer violated sections 2701(a), 2703(a) and 2703(b) 
of the SCA.  In granting the Appellees’ motion to dismiss, the 
District Court found that Walker had not alleged a violation.  It 
further found that qualified immunity was available for claims 
raised under the SCA and that Coffey and Zimmerer were 
again entitled to immunity.  The District Court reasoned that, 
even if an SCA violation had been alleged, qualified immunity 
would be appropriate because the applicable law was unclear 
when the emails were procured.  Walker appeals the District 
Court’s dismissal of her claim. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
to review the District Court’s order of dismissal.  We exercise 
plenary review over a decision to dismiss claims under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In re Nickelodeon Consumer 
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Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 271 (3d Cir. 2016).  To survive a 
motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to raise 
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 
the necessary element[s]” of a cause of action. Phillips v. 
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
 
III. 
 
 This Court, in reviewing the dismissal of Walker’s first 
complaint, held that it was not clearly established that the 
Fourth Amendment afforded her the right “to have the contents 
of her work emails remain free from a law enforcement search, 
absent a warrant or valid exception to the warrant 
requirement.” Walker, 905 F.3d at 144.  The primary question 
before us now is whether the SCA provided Walker with 
heightened privacy rights to her work emails and a cause of 
action resulting from the government’s use of an invalid 
subpoena. 
 
 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the SCA 
does not provide Walker with viable grounds for relief.  The 
SCA is inapplicable because Penn State does not provide 
electronic communication services to the public, and the 
University acted within its rights as Walker’s employer in 
voluntarily disclosing her work emails.  Our holding is a 
narrow one: we are not deciding whether, if the invalid 
subpoena had induced Penn State to disclose Walker’s emails, 
Coffey and Zimmer would have liability under the SCA.  We 
hold only that, given the record before us, the dismissal of the 
claims was proper.  
 
 The Stored Communications Act is Title II of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2701 et seq.  Passed by Congress in 1986, “the SCA was 
enacted because the advent of the Internet presented a host of 
potential privacy breaches that the Fourth Amendment does 
not address.” Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 
892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).  Historically, the Fourth 
Amendment has not protected personal information revealed to 
third parties.  See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
443 (1976) (“The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
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obtaining of information revealed to a third party . . . even if 
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be 
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in 
the third party will not be betrayed.”).  Providers of electronic 
communications act as third parties that store and process their 
users’ private files, meaning the provider-maintained files fall 
outside Fourth Amendment protection.  Because most 
electronic communication providers serve the public but are 
themselves private actors, they could potentially search files 
held under their control and disclose their users’ information 
to the government without violating the Fourth Amendment.  
See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending 
It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1210-11 (2004).   
 
 To address this vulnerability, Congress crafted the SCA 
to protect information held by centralized communication 
providers. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer 
Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 147 (3d Cir. 2015).  The SCA 
“creates a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections 
by statute [by] regulating the relationship between government 
investigators and service providers in possession of users’ 
private information.” Kerr, supra, at 1212.  It provides this 
enhanced privacy protection by limiting the government’s 
ability to compel providers to disclose their users’ information, 
18 U.S.C. § 2703, and by limiting the providers’ ability to 
disclose such information to the government, 18 U.S.C. § 
2702.   
 
 In addition to enhancing privacy rights, the SCA also 
prohibits certain forms of electronic trespass.  Whereas 
sections 2702 and 2703 set forth procedural rules for acquiring 
or disclosing a user’s information, section 2701 prohibits 
intentionally accessing without authorization, or accessing 
beyond authorization, a service provider in order to obtain, 
alter, or prevent authorized access to an electronic 
communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).  Unlike other sections of 
the SCA, liability for violating section 2701 could be damages 
or a fine and imprisonment, depending on the intention of the 
violator.  While sections 2702 and 2703 regulate the 
information given to the government, section 2701 was 
“primarily designed to provide a cause of action against 
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computer hackers.”  State Wide Photocopy Corp. v. Tokai Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 137, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  
 
 Aside from the criminal prohibitions unique to section 
2701, violators of the SCA face civil liability pursuant to 
section 2707.  The section enables service providers, 
subscribers or any “other person aggrieved” to bring a civil 
action against anyone who knowingly and intentionally 
violates the SCA. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a).  Government entities 
are included in those potentially liable where it is established 
that their agents willfully violated the SCA’s provisions. 
Organizacion JD Ltda. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 18 F.3d 91, 95 
(2d Cir. 1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2707(d).  A violation of the Act is 
not enough to satisfy the requirement for Article III standing; 
a plaintiff must allege the SCA violations caused a 
“sufficiently concrete and particularized” injury-in-fact in 
order to have standing to sue. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 
1046 (2019) (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 
(2016)).  If a sufficiently particularized injury is alleged but the 
SCA is found not to apply, the plaintiff may have standing but 
no civil recourse.  See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy 
Litig., 827 F.3d at 273-74, 277.     
 
 It is in this context that we determine whether the 
District Court erred in finding that Coffey and Zimmerer did 
not violate sections 2701 or 2703 of the SCA.  Walker claims 
the OAG officials violated section 2701(a) by gaining 
unauthorized access to Penn State’s electronic 
communications through the use of an invalid subpoena.  She 
claims they violated section 2703, either paragraph (a) or (b), 
by using the invalid subpoena to coerce Penn State to disclose 
her work emails.  Because we conclude Penn State’s 
consensual search of its own server and its voluntary disclosure 
of Walker’s emails to the government did not violate the SCA, 
we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Walker’s second 
amended complaint. 
 
IV. 
 
  Section 2701 of the SCA creates liability for one who 
“(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility 
through which an electronic communication service is 
provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to 
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access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents 
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while 
it is in electronic storage in such system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).  
  
 While the SCA does not define “facility,” it does define 
“electronic communication service” as “any service which 
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or 
electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) 
(incorporated by reference in 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1)).  This Court 
has concluded that “facilities” under the SCA are network 
service providers, which include “telephone companies, 
internet or e-mail service providers, and bulletin board 
services.” In re Google Inc., 806 F.3d at 146 (quoting Garcia 
v. City of Laredo, 702 F.3d 788, 792 (5th Cir. 2012)).  We agree 
with the District Court, therefore, that Penn State qualifies as a 
facility that provides electronic communication services to its 
employees under the terms of the SCA. 
 
 The question becomes, therefore, whether Coffey and 
Zimmerer intentionally “accessed” Penn State’s server under 
the terms of section 2701.  We conclude they did not.1  The 
 
1  We are assuming here, without deciding, that sections 
2701 and 2703 apply to the emails in question, though there is 
a serious argument that they do not.  By their terms, those 
sections apply only to communications “in electronic 
storage[.]”  See 18 U.S.C. §§  2701(a), 2703(a).  “Electronic 
storage” is a term of art under the SCA.  A message can be in 
electronic storage in one of two ways – the “temporary, 
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication 
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof[,]” or the 
“storage of such communication by an electronic 
communication service for purposes of backup protection of 
such communication[.]”  Id. § 2510(17).  The parties agree that 
the first definition is inapplicable here.  Indeed, they must, 
because we have previously held that e-mails, once they have 
been read by the recipient, are no longer in temporary, 
intermediate storage.  See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 20, 2004) 
(holding that e-mails stored on a server were no longer in 
temporary, intermediate storage after they had been read by the 
recipient).  Thus the only way that Walker’s e-mails could be 
held to be in electronic storage is if they were being stored “for 
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SCA does not define “access,” but a dictionary definition of 
the verb is “to get at” or “gain access to.” See United States v. 
Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1058 n.13 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 49 (1986)) (noting 
that “access” as a verb “came into being in the so-called 
‘computer age’”).  Accessing a facility as defined by section 
2701 requires an intrusion into an electronic communication 
system.  Even assuming Coffey and Zimmerer coerced Penn 
State’s Assistant General Counsel with the invalid subpoena to 
acquire Walker’s emails, they themselves did not gain access 
to Penn State’s electronic communications facility.  They 
instead only accessed Walker’s emails, through the assistance 
of a Penn State employee.   
 
 Designed to prohibit “hacking” into electronic 
communication facilities, section 2701 does not cover 
nonintrusive procurements of electronic communications.  
Walker’s argument encourages us to find that the OAG’s use 
of the illegal subpoena rendered Penn State’s search of its own 
facility unauthorized.  But section 2701(c)(1) explicitly 
excepts from liability conduct authorized “by the person or 
entity providing a wire or electronic communications service.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1); see Fraser, 352 F.3d at 114-15 (noting 
 
purposes of backup protection[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).  And 
that is where Walker might run into difficulty, since it is 
arguable that versions of already-read emails that are left on a 
service provider’s server do not qualify as being stored for 
backup protection.  See  Lazette v. Kulmatycki, 949 F. Supp. 2d 
748, 758 & n.13 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (concluding opened e-mails 
are not in storage for backup protection); United States v. 
Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771-73 (C.D. Ill. July 15, 2009) 
(rejecting reasoning that opened emails on a service provider’s 
server are covered by the SCA); Bansal v. Russ, 513 F. Supp. 
2d 264, 276 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that accessing to opened 
e-mail did not violate the SCA).  But see Theofel v. Farley-
Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[a]n obvious 
purpose for storing a message on an [internet service 
provider’s] server after delivery is to provide a second copy of 
the message in the event that the user needs to download it 
again[,]” and so concluding that “[t]he ISP copy of the message 
functions as a ‘backup’ for the user.”).  We do not need to 
address this issue now and therefore do not. 
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the liability exception in section 2701(c)(1) extends to 
employers searching their own electronic communications 
server).  Penn State’s search of its own server to produce 
Walker’s emails is not prohibited by section 2701, regardless 
of whether its counsel was induced by deceit or knowingly 
cooperative.  Because no proscribed intrusion occurred in this 
instance, we deny the claim and turn to Walker’s next ground 
for relief.2 
 
V. 
 
 Walker argues the District Court erred in finding that 
Coffey and Zimmerer’s use of the invalid subpoena did not 
violate section 2703, titled “Required disclosure of customer 
communications or records.”  Given the circumstances of Penn 
State’s disclosure of her emails, we again agree with the 
District Court that this provision of the SCA does not provide 
Walker a viable cause of action.3 
 
 Section 2703 mandates that electronic communication 
providers disclose a user’s information to the government if the 
 
2  Walker claims the disclosure of her emails to the OAG 
was contrary to Penn State’s privacy policy, which recognized 
that she had an expectation of privacy in her emails.  However, 
this argument again misinterprets the applicability of section 
2701.  Penn State had the authority to search and cull her work 
emails.  In citing Penn State’s privacy policy, Walker is 
“relying on a theory of unauthorized disclosure of 
information,” not of one of unauthorized access, and 
disclosures are not covered by section 2701.  In re Am. Airlines, 
Inc. Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 558-59 (N.D. Tex. 
2005) (“Section 2701 does not proscribe unauthorized use or 
disclosure of information obtained from authorized access to a 
facility.”). 
 
3  Although section 2703’s title is “Required disclosure of 
customer communications or records,” the section also 
addresses the disclosure of a subscriber’s information.  Walker 
subscribed to Penn State’s email service as an employee.   
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government meets certain procedural requirements.4  Walker 
argues Coffey and Zimmerer failed to abide by the 
 
4  The relevant parts of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) and (b) are as 
follows: 
 (a) Contents of wire or electronic 
communications in electronic storage. A 
governmental entity may require the disclosure 
by a provider of electronic communication 
service of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, that is in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for one 
hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to 
a warrant[.] . . . A governmental entity may 
require the disclosure by a provider of electronic 
communications services of the contents of a 
wire or electronic communication that has been 
in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for more than one 
hundred and eighty days by the means available 
under subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) Contents of wire or electronic 
communications in a remote computing 
service.— 
(1) A governmental entity may require a provider 
of remote computing service to disclose the 
contents of any wire or electronic 
communication to which this paragraph is made 
applicable by paragraph (2) of this subsection-- 
(A) without required notice to the subscriber or 
customer, if the governmental entity obtains a 
warrant . . .; or 
(B) with prior notice from the governmental 
entity to the subscriber or customer if the 
governmental entity-- 
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requirements when they used a facially invalid subpoena to 
obtain her emails.  She acknowledges, however, that the 
District Court’s ruling that Penn State consented to disclosing 
the emails independently of the illegal subpoena is fatal to her 
claim.  Walker’s argument on appeal, therefore, amounts to an 
attack on the District Court’s conclusion that Penn State 
voluntarily “agreed to produce” her emails. App. 3. 
 
 Walker fails to recognize that this Court, in affirming 
the dismissal of her first complaint, also concluded that Penn 
State’s Assistant General Counsel “instructed an employee in 
her office to assist with the production of [her] emails,” 
choosing to cooperate “rather than contest the validity of the 
subpoena or otherwise limit any search.” Walker, 905 F.3d at 
149-50.  Thus, we have previously decided the issue of whether 
Penn State acted voluntarily, and that decision is the law of the 
case.  The law of the case doctrine dictates that “one panel of 
an appellate court generally will not reconsider questions that 
another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case.” 
In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 717 (3d Cir. 1998).  
The precept fosters “the finality and efficiency of the judicial 
process by protecting against the agitation of settled issues.” In 
re Cont’l. Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 226, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Christianson v. Colt 
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988)).  The law 
of the case governs our exercise of discretion; we can 
reconsider previously decided issues under “extraordinary 
circumstances,” such as if new evidence becomes available, a 
supervening law has been introduced, or the prior decision was 
“clearly erroneous and would create manifest injustice.” In re 
City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d at 718 (citing Pub. Interest 
Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 
F.3d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1997)).  
 
 
(i) uses an administrative subpoena authorized 
by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State 
grand jury or trial subpoena; or 
(ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure 
under subsection (d) of this section[.] 
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 Walker does not allege, much less establish, that 
extraordinary circumstances exist to justify reconsidering 
whether Penn State acted voluntarily in cooperating with the 
government agents.  Because it is the law of the case that Penn 
State consented to disclosing Walker’s emails, we conclude 
that she failed to allege a violation of section 2703.   
  
 Given that Penn State acted voluntarily, we note that the 
disclosure of Walker’s emails is governed by section 2702 of 
the SCA, aptly titled “Voluntary disclosure of customer 
communications or records.”5  Section 2702 requires electronic 
communication service providers to keep communications 
confidential unless a court order, warrant, or subpoena is 
produced.  However, these restrictions apply only to providers 
offering services “to the public.”  18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) 
(emphasis added).  Penn State offers electronic communication 
services to its employees, not to the community at large.  
Walker’s work emails, therefore, fall outside of the scope of 
the SCA’s protection.  See, e.g., Andersen Consulting LLP v. 
UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that 
contract employer did not provide electronic communication 
services to the public and therefore could not be sued under the 
SCA for divulging emails from its server to third parties).  
Because the Act did not restrict Penn State from voluntarily 
providing Coffey and Zimmerer with the requested emails 
from its server, we will affirm the District Court’s finding that 
Walker failed to state a cause of action under the SCA. 
 
 
5 18 U.S.C. § 2702 provides in relevant part: 
 
(a) Prohibitions.--Except as provided in subsection (b) 
or (c)-- 
(1) a person or entity providing an electronic 
communication service to the public shall not 
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents 
of a communication while in electronic storage by that 
service; and 
(2) a person or entity providing remote computing 
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any 
person or entity the contents of any communication 
which is carried or maintained on that service[.] 
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VI. 
 
 In light of our holding that no violation of the SCA 
occurred, we need not reach the issue of whether Coffey and 
Zimmerer are entitled to qualified immunity.  We decline to 
review the holding of the District Court because such a 
decision is not necessary to resolve the case.  We join the prior 
panel of this Court in condemning the OAG’s use of an invalid 
subpoena to obtain evidence and similarly emphasize that our 
holding denying Walker relief should not be interpreted as 
excusing its failure to prepare an enforceable subpoena. 
Walker, 905 F.3d at 150 (“We emphasize that nothing in this 
opinion should be taken as condoning the actions of Appellees 
in this case.”).   
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Appellees 
cannot be found liable under the Stored Communications Act 
and will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Walker’s second amended complaint.  
